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CIVIL PROCEDURE-DISCOVERY OF MEDICAL RECORDS
IN A CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE ACTION-Shelton v.
Morehead Memorial Hospital.
INTRODUCTION

The principle of discovery involves the production of every
man's evidence. Discovery prevents unfair access to crucial evidence held by one of the parties to a lawsuit and prevents trial by
ambush. A privilege from discovery should not be taken lightly.
The United States Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Nixon,' "whatever their origins, . . . exceptions to the demand for
every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."2

In Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hospital,3 the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-95" for the
first time, defining the permissible scope of discovery of hospital
medical records. Section 131E-95 establishes an evidentiary privilege and a privilege from discovery for materials reviewed or generated by medical review committees. The statute provides:
Medical Review Committee
(a) A member of a duly appointed medical review committee
who acts without malice or fraud shall not be subject to liability
for damages in any civil action on account of any act, statement
or proceeding undertaken, made, or performed within the scope
of the functions of the committee.
(b) The proceedings of a medical review committee, the
records and materials it produces and the materials it considers
shall be confidential and not considered public records within the
meaning of G.S. 132-1, '"Public records" defined,' and shall not
be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil
action against a hospital or provider of professional health services which results from matters which are the subject of evalua1. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

2. Id. at 710. See also Davison v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis.
2d 190, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977), for a case where the court refused to recognize a
discovery privilege for hospital records based on the public policy supporting
strict construction of discovery privileges.
3. 318 N.C. 76, 347 S.E.2d 824 (1986).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1986).
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tion and review by the committee. No person who was in attendance at a meeting of the committee shall be required to testify in
any civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or
presented during the proceedings of the committee or as to any
findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions
of the committee or its members. However, information, documents, or records otherwise available are not immune from discovery or use in a civil action merely because they were presented
during proceedings of the committee. A member of the committee
or a person who testifies before the committee may testify in a
civil action but cannot be asked about his testimony before the
committee or any opinions formed as a result of the committee
hearings.5
"Medical Review Committee" is defined by section 131E-76(5) 6 to
be "a committee of a state or local professional society, of a medical staff of a licensed hospital or a peer review corporation or organization which is formed for the purpose of evaluating the quality, cost of, or necessity for hospitalization or health care, including
' '7
medical staff credentialing.
Prior to Shelton, only one North Carolina case had considered
whether there should be a discovery privilege for medical review
committees. In Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospital,8 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the need for candor and
frankness among medical review committee members was essential
in order to improve the quality of health care in hospitals.9 At the
time the complaint was filed in Cameron, no statutory discovery
privilege existed. However, the court concluded that a common law
discovery privilege existed for medical review committees. North
Carolina followed a number of other jurisdictions10 in codifying a
5. Id.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-76(5) (1986).
7. Section 131E-95 and section 131E-76(5) are part of the Hospital Licensure
Act, adopted in 1983 to promote the public health, safety, and welfare by establishing standards for care and treatment of patients in hospitals. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
131E-75(b) (1986).
8. 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901, appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied,
307 N.C. 127, 297 S.E.2d 399 (1982). See infra note 47 and accompanying text for
facts of this case.
9. 58 N.C. App. at 436, 293 S.E.2d at 914.
10. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.030 (1962); AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36445.01A (Supp. 1986); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1987); CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 12-43.5-102(3)(e) (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-7-143 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 624-25.5 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 §
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/6
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discovery privilege for medical review committees. North Carolina
first enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131-1701" in 1981 and recodified section 131-170 into N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-95 in 1983.2
The Shelton court held that materials produced or considered
by hospital medical review committees, along with records of their
proceedings, were entitled to immunity from discovery."3 The court
concluded that the statutory discovery privilege represented a legislative choice preferring medical staff candor over the plaintiff's
need for discovery.1 4 However, the court determined that section
131E-95 provides an exception to the discovery privilege for materials presented to a medical review committee that would otherwise
be discoverable.1 5
This Note will examine the impact of the Shelton decision on
requests for the production of hospital records. The Note will emphasize the application of Shelton to corporate negligence actions
against a hospital for breach of a duty owed by the hospital directly to the patient. The Note will suggest that, although the
Shelton court limited the availability of discovery, diligent plaintiffs may find trial courts less likely to allow a blanket privilege for
hospitals claiming immunity from discovery for records conveniently labeled as products of medical review committees. This
Note will argue that the plaintiff in a corporate negligence action
against a hospital should be entitled to discover the information
that was available to a medical staff review committee at the time
of its evaluation. Placing the plaintiff in this position allows her to
evaluate the actions of the hospital based on the information at its
disposal when it conducted the proceeding. This type of information can be produced for discovery in light of the Shelton decision
without compromising the legislative intent of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
131E-95.
8-2101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(b) (Burns 1986);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.377(2) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 3296 (1964);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (21515) (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.61, 145.64
(Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2048 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 41-675(5) (1983);
PA. STAT. ANN. 63 § 425.4 (Purdon Supp. 1987); TEXAS REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., Art.
4447(d) § 3 (Vernon 1976); VA. CODE § 2.1-342 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
4.24.250 (Supp. 1987).
11. Act of June 29, 1981, ch. 725, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1062, repealed by
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1986).
12. See supra note 4.
13. 318 N.C. at 83, 347 S.E.2d at 829.
14. Id. at 82, 347 S.E.2d at 828.
15. Id. at 84, 347 S.E.2d at 829.
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THE CASE

Dr. Robert J. Ross and Dr. Robert P. Shapiro performed a total hysterectomy on Ann S. Shelton at Morehead Memorial Hospital on January 5, 1983.1" During the operation Mrs. Shelton's bladder was inadvertantly cut, resulting in urine passing through her
vagina following surgery. Mrs. Shelton was forced to undergo four
additional surgical procedures to repair her bladder, resulting in
physical and emotional suffering as well as substantial costs."7
On January 12, 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Shelton filed a civil action
alleging medical malpractice against the estate of Dr. Robert J.
Ross18 and Dr. Robert P. Shapiro. 9 In addition, the Sheltons alleged corporate negligence by Morehead Memorial Hospital on the
grounds that the Hospital Board of Trustees and the Hospital
Medical Staff knew or should have known that Dr. Ross and Dr.
Shapiro were unfit to perform surgery, but that they failed to take
corrective action.20 The Sheltons served interrogatories requesting
that the hospital identify and name the custodian of all records
relating to personnel decisions, disciplinary investigations, patient
complaints, peer evaluations, credential reviews, and competence
reviews of Dr. Ross and Dr. Shapiro.21 The Sheltons also served a
subpoena duces tecum on Amos Tinnell, a former chief executive
officer of the hospital, seeking any information in his possession
requested in the interrogatories.22 The Sheltons later filed motions
to compel discovery of the documents. The hospital, along with
Tinnell, moved for a protective order, claiming that the information and documents sought by the Sheltons were protected from
discovery by section 131E-95.23
The trial court denied the Sheltons' motions to compel discov16. Id. at 78, 347 S.E.2d at 826.
17. Three of the subsequent operations were performed by Dr. Stuart M.
Bergman in Martinsville, Virginia, on January 23, 1983, February 24, 1983, and
March 9, 1983. (Dr. Bergman was also a defendant in Shelton). The fourth and
final operation was performed by Dr. Alfred H. Garvey in Greensboro, North Carolina, on May 1, 1983. (Dr. Garvey was not a defendant in Shelton). 76 N.C. App.
253, 254, 332 S.E.2d 499, 500 (1985).
18. Dr. Ross died in an automobile accident on October 13, 1983. 76 N.C.
App. at 254, 332 S.E.2d at 500.
19. 318 N.C. at 78, 347 S.E.2d at 826.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 78-79, 347 S.E.2d at 826.
23. Id. at 79, 347 S.E.2d at 826-27.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/6
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ery, quashed the subpoena duces tecum issued to Tinnell, and ordered that Tinnell could not be questioned about matters relating
to the hospital's medical review processes.2 4 The court had no precedent upon which to rely, since section 131E-95 had never been
considered by an appellate court. Accordingly, the trial court allowed appellate review, concluding that the rulings affected a substantial right of the Sheltons2
On appeal, the Sheltons claimed the trial court erred by denying their motions to compel discovery and by its orders affecting
the chief executive officer.2 6 The Sheltons argued that the privilege
afforded by section 131E-95 did not apply to their request for discovery because the information requested did not result from matters which were the subject of the evaluation by the review committee.2 7 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
minutes, proceedings, and materials produced by the medical review committees were immune from discovery under section 131E9528 The court relied on its earlier decision in Cameron v. New
Hanover Memorial Hospital,2 9 where it held that the discovery
privilege for medical review committees was necessary in order to
encourage candor and objectivity in the peer review process.3 The
court of appeals also held that the trial court properly quashed the
subpoena duces tecum issued to the former chief executive officer.3 1 However, the court reversed the trial court's ruling extending the discovery privilege to the hospital's board of trustees
because it concluded that the board of trustees did not perform a
32
peer review function.
24. Id., 347 S.E.2d at 827.
25. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court later held that the trial court orders were interlocutory and not appealable. Id. at 80, 347 S.E.2d at 827. See
N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b). (The North Carolina Supreme Court decided the case under
its supervisory powers.).
26. Id. at 79, 347 S.E.2d at 827.
27. Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hosp., 76 N.C. App. 253, 257, 332 S.E.2d
499, 502 (1985). In essence, the Sheltons contended that information regarding
competence and credential reviews prior to Mrs. Shelton's treatment were not the
subject of the review of Mrs. Shelton's surgery. The Sheltons conceded that
records of the review of the surgery performed on Mrs. Shelton were privileged
under section 131E-95.
28. Id. at 257, 332 S.E.2d at 502.
29. 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901 (1982).
30. 76 N.C. App. at 256-57, 332 S.E.2d at 502.
31. Id. at 257, 332 S.E.2d at 502.
32. Id. at 258, 332 S.E.2d at 502-03.
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Both the Sheltons and Morehead Memorial Hospital appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The Sheltons contended
that the discovery privilege did not apply to their corporate negligence action. The hospital argued that the court of appeals erred
in excluding the board of trustees from the statutory discovery
privilege of section 131E-95.
The North Carolina Supreme Court decided the extent to
which section 131E-95 precludes discovery of various hospital
records regarding the hospital's knowledge of personnel investigations and the competence of physicians.3 3 The Shelton court relied
on the court of appeals' decision in Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospital-4 as a basis for its interpretation of the legislative
intent of section 131E-95. The court concluded that, even though
the discovery privilege impaired plaintiffs' access to evidence, the
intent of the legislature was to encourage candor and objectivity in
peer review proceedings.3 5 Furthermore, the Shelton court accepted the corporate negligence doctrine, adopted by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in Bost v. Riley,3 as a valid cause of
action against a hospital. However, the court refused to create an
exception to the discovery privilege of section 131E-95 for corporate negligence actions. 37 The Shelton court stated that an exception to the discovery privilege for corporate negligence actions
would undermine the legislative purpose of encouraging candor
and objectivity." The court also addressed the possibility of plaintiffs circumventing the discovery privilege by including unfounded
corporate negligence claims in all hospital medical malpractice
33. 318 N.C. at 77-78, 347 S.E.2d at 826.
34. 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901.
35. 318 N.C. at 82, 347 S.E.2d at 828.
36. 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269
S.E.2d 621 (1980).
37. 318 N.C. at 82, 347 S.E.2d at 828-29. In addition to Bost v. Riley, the
Shelton court cited the following cases supporting the application of section
131E-95 to corporate negligence actions: West Covina Hosp. v. Superior Court,
153 Cal. App. 3d 134, 200 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984), modified, 41 Cal. 3d 846, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1986); Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr.
317 (1974); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156
(1982); Segal v. Roberts, 380 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. App. 1979); Hollowell v. Jove, 247
Ga. 678, 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981); Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 82 Ill. Dec. 382, 468
N.E.2d 1162 (1984); Texarkana Memorial Hosp. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.
1977).
38. 318 N.C. at 82, 347 S.E.2d at 828.
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The Shelton court held that minutes and other records generated by medical staff review committees were protected from discovery by section 131E-95.10 However, the court held that the trial
court erred in denying the Sheltons' motion to compel discovery of
other materials.4" The court stated that the hospital could be required to identify the documents requested, along with the source
and custodian, without impinging on the privilege.2 The Shelton
court also determined that some additional sources of discovery
are not protected by section 131E-95. The court held that the
board of trustees was not entitled to a privilege from discovery because the board was not a committee of the medical staff.43 Finally,

the court held that the former chief executive officer could be required to produce records of direct complaints, incident reports,
and allegations of unprofessional conduct, professional negligence,
or incompetence regarding Dr. Ross or Dr. Shapiro."4 Although the
Shelton court permitted discovery of records held by the board of
trustees and the chief executive officer, the court stated that
records which were privileged because they were generated by
medical review committees did not lose their immunity when forwarded to the chief executive officer or the board.46
The Shelton court provided a promising source of discovery
for plaintiffs by concluding that the statutory privilege of section
39. See Comment, Anatomy Of The Conflict Between Hospital Medical
Staff Peer Review Confidentiality And Medical Malpractice Plaintiff Recovery:
A Case For Legislative Amendment, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 661, 678 (1984), for
a discussion of plaintiffs in California using corporate negligence actions to circumvent the statutory discovery privilege for medical review committees.
40. 318 N.C. at 87, 347 S.E.2d at 831.
41. Id. at 86, 347 S.E.2d at 831.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 84, 347 S.E.2d at 829-30. The Shelton court cited the following
cases to support its conclusion that records and minutes of the board of trustees
were not privileged: West Covina Hosp. v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 3d 134,
200 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984), modified, 41 Cal. 3d 846, 226 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1986);
Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974); Mercy
Hosp. v. Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Medical Examiners, 467
So. 2d 1058 (Fla. App. 1985); Segal v. Roberts, 380 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. App. 1979);
Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981); Anderson v. Breda, 103
Wash. 2d 901, 700 P.2d 737 (1985); Good Samaritan Medical Center-Deaconess
Campus v. Maroney, 123 Wis. 2d 89, 365 N.W.2d 887 (1985). But see Texarkana
Memorial Hosp. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1977).
44. 318 N.C. at 88, 347 S.E.2d at 832.
45. Id. at 84-85, 347 S.E.2d at 830.
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131E-95 created an exception for information considered by medical review committees which was otherwise discoverable prior to
being presented to a committee."' This exception for materials considered by medical review committees is the most viable means of
discovery for corporate negligence plaintiffs.
BACKGROUND

Prior to Shelton, the only North Carolina case considering
whether there was a discovery privilege for medical review commit47
tee records was Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospital.
Cameron involved two podiatrists who sued the hospital for wrongful denial of surgical staff privileges."s The podiatrists sought discovery of the minutes of the Executive Committee of the Medical
Staff, as well as minutes of other medical staff committee meetings, in order to show conspiratorial conduct by the committees."'
At the time the Cameron complaint was filed, no statutory discovery privilege for medical review committees existed in North Carolina.5 0 However, the North Carolina legislature enacted section
131-170,51 the statutory predecessor to section 131E-95, before the
46. Id. at 83, 347 S.E.2d at 829.
47. 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E. 901, rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 307
N.C 127, 297 S.E.2d 399 (1982).
48. The physicians challenged a provision in the bylaws of New Hanover Memorial Hospital which required podiatrists to complete a year of residence, be
board eligible under requirements of the American Board of Podiatric Surgery,
and be Fellows in the American College of Foot Surgeons in order to be considered for surgical staff privileges. 58 N.C. App. at 421, 293 S.E.2d at 906.
49. 58 N.C. App. at 417, 293 S.E.2d at 904. Some hospital staff physicians
contended that podiatrists (formerly chiropodists) were not qualified to perform
in-patient surgery using general anesthesia. See 58 N.C. App. at 417, 293 S.E.2d
at 904-11.
50. 58 N.C. App. at 435, 293 S.E.2d at 914.
51. Section 131-170 (repealed 1984), see supra note 11, reads:
Introduction of records into evidence; testimony of members of committees.
-The proceedings of, records and materials produced by, and the materials considered by a committee are not subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a provider of professional
health services arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by the committee, and no person who was in attendance
at a meeting of the committee shall be required to testify in any civil
action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during
the proceedings of the committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions of the committee or its
members. However, information, documents, or records otherwise availa-
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court of appeals decided Cameron. Although section 131-170 did
not control, the court relied on the statute as an indication of the
public policy supporting immunity from discovery for medical review committee records. 2 In the absence of authority, the Cameron court relied on common law principles and public policy. 53
The Cameron court held that a common law qualified privilege existed which protected the minutes and records of medical
staff review committees from discovery.65 The court cited the case
of Matchett v. Superior Court,55 in which a California Court of
Appeal, while construing a statutory discovery privilege similar to
section 131-170, 5' stated that the statute ".

.

. was enacted upon

the theory that external access to peer investigations conducted by
staff committees stifles candor and inhibits objectivity. 5 The
Matchett court concluded that the discovery privilege represented
ble are not immune from discovery or use in any civil action merely because they were presented during proceedings of the committee nor
should any person who testifies before the committee or who is a member
of the committee be prevented from testifying as to matters within his
knowledge, but the witness cannot be asked about his testimony before
the committee or opinions formed by him as a result of the committee
hearings.
52. 58 N.C. App. at 437, 293 S.E.2d at 915.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
56. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157, effective when Matchett was decided, provides:
Neither the proceedings nor the records of organized committees of medical staffs in hospitals having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of care rendered in the hospital or medical review committees of local medical societies shall be subject to discovery.
Except as hereinafter provided, no person in attendance at a meeting of
any such committee shall be required to testify as to what transpired
thereat. The prohibition relating to discovery or testimony shall not apply to the statements made by any person in attendance at such a meeting who is a party to an action or proceeding the subject matter of which
was reviewed at such meeting, or to any person requesting hospital staff
privileges or in any action against an insurance carrier alleging bad faith
by the carrier in refusing to accept a settlement offer within the policy
limits.
The prohibitions contained in this section shall not apply to medical
society committees that exceed ten percent of the membership of the society, nor. to any such committee if any person serves upon the committee when his own conduct or practice is being reviewed.
115 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1987).
57. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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a legislative choice embracing the goal of medical staff candor at
the cost of impairing plaintiffs' access to evidence." The Cameron
court also relied on Presnell v. Pell,59 a libel action in which the
North Carolina Supreme Court enunciated the elements of privileged communications. The Cameron court, quoting Presnell,
stated that a qualified privilege arises when:
(1) a communication is made in good faith,
(2) the subject and scope of the communication is one in which
the party uttering it has a valid interest to uphold, or in reference
to which he has a legal right or duty, and
(3) the communication is made to a person or persons having a
corresponding interest, right, or duty.60
The Cameron court combined the policy underlying privileged
communications with the policy supporting a privilege from discovery for medical review committees to reach its decision that a
common law qualified privilege from discovery existed for medical
review committees. The court also stated that section 131-170 reflected the common law policy of encouraging candor and frankness in medical review committee meetings in an effort to improve
the quality of health care in hospitals. 1
In Shelton, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that section 131E-95 superseded any common law discovery privilege for
medical review committees that existed in North Carolina prior to
the enactment of a statutory discovery privilege.2 Although the
statute replaced the common law privilege adopted by the Cameron court, the Shelton court cited Cameron for its interpretation
of the policy underlying the discovery privilege for medical review
committees.
In Shelton, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
corporate negligence doctrine, previously adopted by the court of
58. Id., 115 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
59. 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
60. 58 N.C. App. at 436, 293 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C.
715 at 720, 260 S.E.2d 611 at 614 [1979]) (emphasis in original). See also 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961), for elements of a common law
qualified privilege for communications, and Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., 50 F.R.D.
249 (D.D.C. 1970) for a federal court decision applying a common law qualified
discovery privilege to a request for discovery from medical staff review
committees.
61. 58 N.C. App. at 437, 293 S.E.2d at 915.
62. 318 N.C. at 86, 347 S.E.2d at 830-31.
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appeals in Bost v. Riley." Corporate negligence refers to the tort
liability of a hospital for its negligent acts. Under the doctrine of
corporate negligence, the hospital owes certain duties directly to
the patient, the breach of which will result in liability of the hospital to the patient.6
The leading case recognizing the corporate liability of a hospital for the negligence of a staff physician is Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital." Prior to Darling, hospitals were
held liable for negligent acts of employee physicians only under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.6 Hospitals were generally not
held liable for the acts of staff physicians, who were viewed as independent contractors and therefore not subject to hospital control
or supervision.6 7 In Darling,the plaintiff broke his leg during a college football game.6 8 The staff physician, who was on-call for the
emergency room, placed a plaster cast on the leg in a manner that
restricted the blood flow.69 After being admitted to the hospital by
the treating physician, the plaintiff complained of pain in his leg,
but no action was taken until two days later when the cast was
removed.70 By the time the cast was removed the leg had become
gangrenous and had to be amputated below the knee. 71 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the jury verdict of hospital negligence. 72 The verdict was based on the hospital's failure to provide
a sufficient number of trained nurses and on its failure to review
the treatment rendered by its staff physician.73 The Darling decision was important because it established that a hospital has a
63. 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269
S.E.2d 621 (1980).
64. Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-ExpandingResponsibilities
Change Its Relationship With the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429, 437
(1973) (hereinafter cited as Southwick). See infra note 83 for duties recognized by
North Carolina courts.
65. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
66. Southwick, supra note 64, at 440. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its servant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
KEETON,

1984).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

D.

§ 219 (1958). See generally W.

D. DOBBS, R.
§ 69 (5th ed.

KEETON,

OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

Southwick, supra note 64, at 434.
33 Ill. 2d at 328, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
Id. at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 255-56.
Id. at 328, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
Id. at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
Id. at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
Id.
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duty to monitor the quality of its medical staff, including independent and private practitioners."4 The Darling decision was also important because the court held that standards promulgated by the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) were
admissible for the purpose of establishing hospital negligence. 75
The doctrine of corporate negligence was a judicial response to
the changing role of hospitals. 76 The community hospital was once
viewed as a workshop providing physicians with the physical facilities and equipment necessary to treat their patients in an individualized manner; but, by the early 1960s, the practice of medicine
had become institutionalized.77 Physicians began to depend on
hospitals to facilitate their treatment of patients, while patients relied on hospitals as a primary provider of routine health care. Patients without a family doctor could go to the hospital emergency
room where a doctor would be assigned to treat them. The doctrine
of corporate negligence was imposed by courts based on the superior position of the hospital in regulating the quality of medical
care rendered by staff physicians. Under the doctrine of corporate
74. Following Darling,a number of jurisdictions adopted the doctrine of corporate negligence. See, e.g., Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34,
545 P.2d 958 (1976); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 156 (1982); Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 570 P.2d 544 (1977); Joiner
v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), aff'd, 229
Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236
N.W.2d 543 (1975); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Foley v.
Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970); Moore v.
Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605 (1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 183 N.J. Super.
302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 65 A.D.2d 388, 411 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1978); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, disc. rev. denied, 300
N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d 621 (1980); Utter v. United Hosp. Center Inc., 160 W. Va.
703, 236 S.E.2d 213 (1977); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d
708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
75. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals [hereinafter
JCAH] is a private, non-profit organization that establishes minimum standards
for hospital patient care. It was organized in 1952 by the American College of
Physicians, the American College of Surgeons, the American Hospital Association,
the American Medical Association, and the Canadian Medical Association. The
goal of the JCAH is to improve the quality of medical care by implementation of
standards for hospital patient care throughout the nation. See generally Holbrook
and Dunn, Medical Malpractice Litiqation: The Discoverability and Use of Hospitals' Quality Assurance Committee Records, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 54 (1976).
76. Southwick, supra note 64, at 445.
77. See Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207,
211-12, 495 P.2d 605, 608, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 879 (1972).
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negligence, a hospital has a duty to use reasonable care in the selection and supervision of physicians."'
Although the hospital governing body is ultimately liable for
the corporate negligence of a hospita 7 9, it delegates the duty to
screen applications and assess the competence of staff physicians
to medical staff review committees.80 However, the governing body
retains final authority regarding personnel decisions involving staff
privileges and disciplinary actions. Medical staff review committees81 must perform conscientious and thorough evaluations to ensure that the risk of medical malpractice within the hospital is
minimal. Based on their evaluations, medical review committees
make recommendations to the hospital governing body, who then
establishes policies and procedures based on the advice of the
medical staff.
North Carolina expressly adopted this corporate negligence
doctrine in 1980 in the case of Bost v. Riley.8 2 However, the North
78. Note, Corporate Negligence of Hospitals and the Duty to Monitor and
Oversee Medical Treatment, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 309, 321 (1981).
79. See generally Copeland, HospitalResponsibility for Basic Care Provided
By Medical Staff Members: "Am I My Brother's Keeper?" 5 N. Ky. L. REV. 27
(1978); Comment, Reallocating Liability to Medical Staff Review Committee
Members: A Response to the Hospital CorporateLiability Doctrine, 10 AM. J.L.
& MED. 115 (1984).
80. This duty must be delegated to the medical staff since the governing
body is usually composed of laypersons who lack the expertise necessary for the
assessment and review of the competence of physicians. See Comment, supra
note 39, at 668.
81. The JCAH has established procedures requiring hospital medical staffs to
provide mechanisms for the regular review, evaluation, and monitoring of medical
staff functions. Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual For Hospitals 122 (1987). A medical staff review committee, usually
called a credentials committee, evaluates the qualifications and competence of
staff members. Other medical review committees monitor the quality of care
within the hospital by evaluating length of stay, unexplained deaths, utilization of
equipment, and utilization of facilities. Medical departments, e.g. obstetrics, cardiology, orthopedics, and neurology, establish committees to evaluate surgical
procedures performed by individual physicians within the department.
82. 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d
621 (1980). See generally Note, supra note 78. In Bost, the plaintiff's son, Lee
Bost, was taken to Catawba Memorial Hospital following a bicycle accident. Dr.
Riley performed a splenectomy and placed Lee Bost in intensive care. Complications developed, forcing additional surgery where it was discovered that Lee Bost
had a twisted intestine blocking his blood supply. Three feet of gangrenous bowel
were removed, but the boy's condition did not improve. Lee Bost died of liver
failure due to the complications following surgery. 44 N.C. App. at 639-41, 262
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Carolina Court of Appeals found that the doctrine had been implicitly accepted in a number of cases prior to Bost. s3 The Bost
court concluded that the duties recognized in prior cases were duties which flowed directly from the hospital to the patient, and
held that a breach of any of these duties could be termed corporate
negligence."" The court stated that if a patient has the reasonable
expectation that the hospital will attempt to cure him, the hospital
should have the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and
oversee the treatment which is prescribed and rendered by physicians practicing in the hospital.85
S.E.2d at 392-93. The trial court determined that the hospital may have breached
its duty to oversee treatment by not requiring its staff physician to keep progress
notes. The trial court, however, held that the plaintiff failed to prove the breach
of duty contributed to the injuries. Id. at 648, 262 S.E.2d at 397. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding as to proximate cause. Id.
83. 44 N.C. App. at 647, 262 S.E.2d at 396. The duties generally recognized in
North Carolina that are owed by a hospital directly to a patient are: 1) the duty
to exercise reasonable care in providing proper medical equipment, medication,
and food; 2) the duty to use reasonable care in maintaining safe physical premises; 3) the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment; and 4) the duty to use reasonable care in the selection and retention of staff
members. See also Campbell v. Pitt Cty. Memorial Hosp. Inc., 84 N.C. App. 314,
352 S.E.2d 902 (1987), for a recent decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals holding that there is a duty for a hospital to obtain the informed consent of
a surgical patient. See generally Hollowell and Wilson, The CorporateNegligence
Doctrine Expanded: The Requirement of Informed Consent, Campbell Law Observer, March 27, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
84. 44 N.C. App. at 647, 262 S.E.2d at 396.
85. The corporate negligence doctrine has had limited impact in North Carolina. In the six reported cases applying the doctrine, only the most recent case,
Campbell v. Pitt Cty. Memorial Hosp. Inc., 84 N.C. App. 314, 352 S.E.2d 902
(1987) has resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Cox v. Haworth, 54
N.C. App. 328, 283 S.E.2d 392 (1981) (summary judgment for the hospital where
the physician was held to be an independent contractor); Jones v. New Hanover
Memorial Hosp., 55 N.C. App. 545, 286 S.E.2d 374, disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C.
586, 292 S.E.2d 570 (1982) (summary judgment for the hospital where the court
held the corporate negligence doctrine applied prospectively). The remaining
North Carolina cases based on corporate negligence are: Paris v. Kreitz, 75 N.C.
App. 365, 331 S.E.2d 234, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 185, 337 S.E.2d 858 (1985) (a
nurse's opinion on a patient's condition different from the physician was not disobeying instructions of the physician); Burns v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc.,
81 N.C. App. 556, 344 S.E.2d 839 (1986) (directed verdict for the hospital where
the plaintiff failed to establish that the hospital's breach of duty was the proximate cause of injury).
In Blanton v. Cone Memorial Hosp., 319 N.C. 372, 354 S.E.2d 455 (1987), the
North Carolina Supreme Court recently concluded that use of the term corporate
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/6
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The doctrine of corporate negligence recognizes the superior
position of the hospital in the regulation and delivery of health
care. Courts impose this doctrine on hospitals in order to encourage them to conscientiously evaluate the various aspects of
treatment provided. The discovery privilege of section 131E-95 is a
legislative measure also designed to encourage conscientious and
candid review of hospital medical care. Both the discovery privilege and the corporate negligence doctrine are designed to improve
the quality of health care in hospitals. However, the two measures
conflict in practical application. A plaintiff who brings an action
based on corporate negligence is stymied by the discovery privilege. Although intended to shield the proceedings of medical review committees, the discovery privilege has been used as a sword
by hospitals to fend off corporate negligence plaintiffs. The public
policy supporting the privilege for medical review committees must
be balanced against the public policy supporting corporate negligence actions. Shelton offered the North Carolina Supreme Court
the opportunity to apply the discovery privilege found in section
131E-95 to corporate negligence actions and to provide guidelines
for application of the privilege to the discovery of various categories of hospital records.
ANALYSIS

In Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hospital, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the proceedings, records produced,
and materials considered by hospital medical review committees
were immune from discovery under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-95.11
negligence is unnecessary. 319 N.C. at 375, 354 S.E.2d at 457. The court stated
that where a hospital is not liable under respondeat superior because the doctor
is not an agent of the hospital, the hospital will still be liable if an agent of the
hospital has breached a duty owed by the hospital to the patient. The Blanton
court stated that the hospital's actions are to be evaluated based on ordinary negligence principles. Therefore, the test is whether a hospital did what an ordinary
reasonable and prudent man would have done. Id.
Although the Blanton court stated that use of the term "corporate negligence" is unnecessary, the doctrine remains viable in North Carolina. A plaintiff
can still hold a hospital liable for acts of physicians who are not agents if the
plaintiff can show the hospital breached one of the duties of care recognized as
owed by a hospital directly to a patient. The court was correct in concluding that
corporate negligence is nothing more than application of ordinary negligence principles. However, use of the term corporate negligence is helpful in distinguishing
actions brought under a theory other than respondeat superior.
86. 318 N.C. at 83, 347 S.E.2d at 829.
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The court also held that the discovery privilege afforded by section
131E-95 applies to corporate negligence actions against a hospital. 87 The Shelton court further held that section 131E-95 provides
an exception to the privilege which permits discovery of materials
considered by a medical review committee if the materials would
have been otherwise available for discovery. 88
In Shelton, the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted to
define the permissible scope of discovery of hospital records. While
the court had little trouble finding that section 131E-95 protects
the records and minutes of medical review committees from discovery, it failed to provide a concise explanation of the discoverability of specific categories of hospital records. The Shelton court,
deciding a case of first impression, chose to limit its decision to the
particular facts of the case. The court concluded that an exception
to the discovery privilege exists for materials generated by "original sources,"8' 9 but it declined to elaborate on or describe these
sources. However, the court did state that the exception to the discovery privilege for original sources should be sufficient to allow a
plaintiff in a corporate negligence action to make a prima facie
showing. 90 Since the court addressed the exception for materials
produced by original sources but refused to go into detail, the decision must be taken a step further to analyze the practical application of the exception.
A plaintiff in a corporate negligence action should be entitled
to discover the information that was available to a medical review
committee prior to its evaluation. Permitting discovery of the information that was reviewed by the committee would enable a
plaintiff to conduct a review to determine whether the hospital acted appropriately based on the information available. A hospital
could produce the materials that existed prior to a review committee proceeding without compromising the intent of section 131E95. Although the Shelton court failed to specify what records were
included as original sources, the court's opinion indicates that the
discovery privilege should be limited to the conduct and products
of review proceedings. The purpose of section 131E-95 is not furthered by allowing all records and reports generated by a hospital
staff to be immune from discovery. The discovery privilege merely
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 82, 347 S.E.2d at 828-29.
Id. at 83, 347 S.E.2d at 829.
Id.
Id.
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prevents the chilling effect that would result from disclosure of the
contents of a review proceeding. In today's litigious society, physicians have become cautious about what they say and do professionally, for fear of a lawsuit. The candor and frankness necessary
for thorough evaluations cannot take place in an atmosphere of apprehension. To overcome this apprehension, section 131E-95 provides immunity from civil actions for review committee members
in addition to the evidentiary privilege and discovery privilege."
Trial courts interpreting Shelton must be conscious of the purpose
of section 131E-95 so that the privilege is not extended beyond its
original intent.
A.

Review Commmitee Members

The Shelton court concluded that the exception for original
sources applies to members of a medical review committee.2 The
court stated that a person who is a member of a medical review
committee cannot claim the discovery privilege for information
learned from sources outside the committee. 3 This exception includes information that the committee member learns independently but shares with the committee. The Shelton court cited Eu94 in which the Georgia Supreme Court,
banks v. Ferrier,
while
interpreting a statute similar to section 131E-95,9 5 permitted discovery of information known by committee members prior to the
review proceeding. The Eubanks court also stated that a plaintiff
can pose hypothetical questions to any review committee member
without defeating the intent of the statutory discovery privilege.9
The ability to question individual review committee members
would allow corporate negligence plaintiffs to evaluate whether a
proper review occurred without intruding on the review process.
B. Factual Information and Statistical Data
A plaintiff can discover factual information and statistical
data without impinging on the purpose of section 131E-95. The
Shelton court stated that information obtained from sources other
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See
318
Id.
245
See
245

iupra note 4 and accompanying text.
N.C. at 83, 347 S.E.2d at 829.
Ga. 763, 267 S.E.2d 230 (1980).
Ga. Code Ann. § 31-7-143 (1983).
Ga. at 765, 267 S.E.2d at 233.
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than medical review committees, in whatever form available,97 is

not immune from discovery merely because the information was
presented to a medical review committee. 8 In Anderson v.
Breda,99 the Washington Supreme Court considered a case where
the plaintiff sought to discover information concerning the revocation of a physician's hospital privileges. The court held that the
Washington statutory discovery privilege '00 did not prevent discovery of factual information ascertainable apart from medical review
101
committee records.
In Gillman v. United States,102 a federal district court decided
a case in which the plaintiff requested discovery of factual statements of hospital personnel. The Gillman court held that statements of what actually happened are a necessary part of discovery
to prevent contrivance.10 3 The court reasoned that statements
made soon after the occurrence of an event could never be precisely duplicated, and therefore discovery should be allowed.104
Discovery of factual information would not inhibit candor or
objectivity in a review proceeding since this information exists
prior to the proceeding. Hospitals keep a variety of factual records
which could be assimilated when requested for discovery without
reference to any review that may have been performed by a medical review committee. Factual records and reports which are not
the product of a review proceeding are one category of original
source materials that should be available for discovery based on
the Shelton decision.
C. Applications for Staff Privileges
Based on the Shelton decision, applications for hospital staff
privileges should be discoverable. Discovery of factual information
contained in applications for staff privileges does not conflict with
the legislative goal of improving the quality of health care by providing confidentiality for the discussions and remarks of review,
97. Emphasis supplied.
98. 318 N.C. at 83, 347 S.E.2d at 829.
99. 103 Wash. 2d 901, 700 P.2d 737 (1985).
100. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.250 (1981).
101. 103 Wash. 2d at 907, 700 P.2d at 742.
102. 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). This case involved a widow suing on behalf of her husband, who committed suicide while confined to a mental
institution.
103. Id. at 319.
104. Id.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/6
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committee members. The Shelton court stated that records and
documents furnished by physicians in their applications for privileges are not privileged under section 131E-95.10 5 This information,
together with the hospital's application form, would permit a
plaintiff to evaluate whether the hospital thoroughly examined the
competence of the physician prior to granting staff or surgical privileges. A corporate negligence plaintiff should be provided with the
data furnished by a physician in his application in order to: 1) verify its authenticity and truthfulness and 2) evaluate whether the
hospital acted appropriately in granting staff or surgical
privileges. 1°6
D. Patient Records
The original source exception should include discovery of relevant records of patients treated by the defendant physicians at the
hospital where the tort occurred. Discovery of the records of former patients would not conflict with the legislative purpose of encouraging open discussions in evaluation and review proceedings.
Records of former patients contain factual information and, taken
collectively, these records comprise statistical data which should
not be immune from discovery in a corporate negligence action.
The physician-patient privilege must be addressed when deciding the discoverability of records of patients other than the
plaintiff. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53 (1986) establishes a qualified privilege designed to encourage open communication between physician
and patient based on the assurance of confidentiality. 0 7 In

Shelton, the hospital raised the issue of physician-patient privilege
on appeal in response to the Sheltons' request for production of
records of former patients of the defendant physicians. Since the
issue was not raised in the trial court, the Shelton court did not
decide whether the hospital could assert the physician-patient
105. 318 N.C. at 87, 347 S.E.2d at 831.
106. See Good Samaritan Medical Center-Deaconness Hosp. Campus v. Maroney, 123 Wis. 2d 89, 365 N.W.2d 887 (1985), in which the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals held that the decision of the hospital governing board on the issue of
whether to grant staff privileges was not protected by the statutory discovery
privilege. The court stated that, where the plaintiffs' only requested information
was on the renewal of an application and not on the conclusions of a peer review
committee, discovery would not inhibit open discussion among committee members. Id. at 86, 365 N.W.2d at 892.
107. See Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954).
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privilege. 0 8 However, the Shelton court stated that, if the privilege
applied, the trial court could still require disclosure of the information if the court finds disclosure "necessary to a proper administration of justice." 10 91
A plaintiff attempting to prove corporate negligence would not
need patients' names or other identifying information. The plaintiff would only need the medical information contained in the
records. By permitting discovery of the excised records of former
patients, a plaintiff could evaluate the information contained in
the records to determine whether the hospital knew or should have
known about the competence of the defendant physician prior to
his treatment of the plaintiff. By excising all identifying information, a hospital could produce the records of former patients without breaching the privilege of section 8-53. Other jurisdictions have
adopted procedures allowing discovery of patient records after excising all identifying information. In Ziegler v. Superior Court,110
the Arizona Court of Appeals approved the plaintiffs' request for
discovery of the hospital records of twenty-four patients who had
received pacemakers from the defendant physician. The court
stated that excising the names and addresses of the patients removed the physician-patient privilege claim."' The Colorado Supreme Court also allowed discovery of the hospital records of former patients of the defendant physician in Community Hospital
Association v. District Court."2 The court affirmed the trial
court's order requiring the hospital to produce copies of all preoperative consultation records, operative notes, interpretations of
pre-operative x-rays, and brain tissue analyses of 140 former patients of the defendant physician after excising all identifying
information. 3
Discovery of former patients' hospital records in a corporate
negligence action would not compromise the legislative intent of
108. 318 N.C. at 86, 347 S.E.2d at 831.
109. Id. See also Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125
S.E.2d 326 (1962).
110. 134 Ariz. 390, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. App. 1982).
111. Id. at 394, 656 P.2d at 1254. The plaintiff's expert witnesses subsequently testified that in twenty of the twenty-four records reviewed, there was
malpractice due to unnecessary implantation of pacemakers. Id. at 393, 656 P.2d
at 1253.
112. 194 Colo. 98, 99, 570 P.2d 243, 244 (1977).
113. Id. See also Louisville Gen. Hosp. v. Hellman, 500 S.W.2d 790 (Ky.
1973).
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section 131E-95. A hospital could excise the identifying information, thereby sanitizing the records for discovery. The Shelton
court stated that the physician-patient privilege, if applicable, is a
qualified privilege which may.be waived by the trial court in the
interests of justice. The original source exception to section 131E95 would permit discovery of hospital records of patients other
than the plaintiff, since these records could be made available for
discovery without providing records of the proceedings of a medical review committee.
E. In-Camera Review
The most appropriate method of deciding what information is
entitled to immunity from discovery under section 131E-95 is
through the use of an in-camera procedure. The trial court could
determine whether information requested by the plaintiff was produced by a medical review committee or whether it is otherwise
discoverable. The hospital seeking to avoid discovery must demonstrate that the information requested is subject to the statutory
discovery privilege. This burden is placed on the hospital since discovery privileges are in derogation of the common law and the general policy favoring discovery.""
An in-camera review would also allow the trial court to preserve disputed materials for appellate review. Although the
Shelton court held that denial of a motion to compel discovery is
not subject to an interlocutory appeal," 5 a plaintiff could preserve
her claim for appeal following a final decision. The trial court
could seal any disputed documents and forward them to the appellate court. The hospital objecting to a trial court order compelling
discovery would still be able to appeal this decision since disclosure would be irreparable and affect a substantial right.
Trial courts must develop a method for implementation of the
discovery procedure for hospital records in the wake of the Shelton
decision. The ambiguity of the court's opinion creates uncertainty
about the impact of Shelton from the standpoint of both the hospital and the plaintiff. Other jurisdictions have adopted an incamera procedure when considering requests for hospital records
in light of a statutory discovery privilege for medical review com114. See, e.g., Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash. 2d 270, 276, 677 P.2d 173, 177
(1984) (privileges must be strictly construed and limited to the purpose intended
by the legislature).
115. 318 N.C. at 80, 347 S.E.2d at 827. See supra note 25.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1987

21

Campbell
Law Review,
10, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 6
LAWVol.
REVIEW
CAMPBELL

[Vol. 10:193

mittees. In Saddleback Community Hospital v. Superior Court,'1 6
a California Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court
for an in-camera review to determine whether personnel files
sought by the plaintiff contained information generated by a hospital medical review committee.11 7 In Sherman v. District Court,"8
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the hospital claiming immunity from discovery based on a statutory privilege must produce
the documents requested in order for the trial court to determine
whether there were portions of the requested JCAH surveys which
were not produced for peer review proceedings. 9 The Sherman
court ordered the trial court to preserve the materials produced by
20
the hospital for appellate review.'
The procedure for determining what materials are discoverable in corporate negligence actions remains unclear following
Shelton. The Shelton court did not address the issue of implementation of requests for discovery in light of this decision. In applying
the Shelton decision to discovery requests by corporate negligence
plaintiffs, trial courts can make an in-camera review of the requested materials and require the defendant hospital to prove
whether the discovery privilege applies. The trial court reviewing
requested materials could restrict discovery to relevant facts while
prohibiting discovery of the findings or conclusions of a medical
review committee.
Although the Shelton court declined to provide guidelines for
the discovery of various categories of hospital records, the court
emphasized that an exception to section 131E-95 exists for information generated by original sources. The court stated that the exception should provide sufficient discovery materials to allow corporate negligence plaintiffs to prove a breach of duty by a hospital
where it exists. By allowing discovery of relevant statistical data,
factual information, staff privilege applications, patient records,
and information obtained from individual committee members, the
doctrine of corporate negligence may become a viable method of
holding hospitals accountable for their negligent acts. Although the
court failed to elaborate on the specific categories of hospital
records that may be discoverable, the Shelton decision could be
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

158 Cal. App. 3d 206, 204 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1984).
Id. at 209, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
637 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1981).
Id. at 384.
Id.
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very effective in affording trial courts sufficient leeway to develop a
workable procedure for discovery of hospital records. What appears at first blush to be a hollow victory for the Sheltons may
evolve into the vehicle that forces hospitals to be more forthright
with their production of records for discovery.
CONCLUSION

In Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hospital, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the discovery privilege for medical
review committees under section 131E-95 precludes discovery of
the proceedings, records, or materials considered by hospital medical review committees. The court also held that the discovery privilege applies to corporate negligence actions against a hospital for
breach of a duty owed directly to a patient. However, the Shelton
court concluded that an exception to the discovery privilege exists
for records which are otherwise discoverable.
The Shelton decision is consistent with decisions of other jurisdictions that have enacted a statutory discovery privilege for
medical review committees in an effort to encourage candor in review committee proceedings. The legislatively created discovery
privilege is designed to improve the quality of health care in hospitals. Many jurisdictions have also judicially adopted the corporate
negligence doctrine in order to encourage hospitals to conscientiously review the quality of health care administered within these
institutions. In North Carolina, as in many other states, the discovery privilege for medical review committees limits the effectiveness
of the corporate negligence doctrine by foreclosing certain hospital
records from discovery.
The Shelton court attempted to resolve the conflict between
the two methods of improving hospital health care by emphasizing
that an exception to the discovery privilege exists. Based on the
exception for original sources of information, corporate negligence
plaintiffs should be provided discovery of the information available
to a review committee prior to conducting an evaluation. The legislative intent of section 131E-95 is not undermined by allowing discovery of the information the hospital had at its disposal prior to a
review proceeding. Following the North Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in Shelton, corporate negligence plaintiffs should be permitted to discover statistical data, factual information, information
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contained in applications for privileges, information obtained from
committee members, and patient records.
G. Bruce Park
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